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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
     The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of 
Eduction ("PDE") appeals from a final decision of the United 
States Secretary of Education requiring Pennsylvania to refund 
$3,082,088.95 to the United States.  PDE argues that the 
Secretary erred in denying PDE an evidentiary hearing, and that 
the Secretary's decision violates Pennsylvania's sovereign right 
to interpret its own statutes.  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm the decision of the Secretary. 
                                I. 
     The underlying facts of this case involve the interplay 
between federal and state programs which fund vocational 
education, and the requirements states must meet in order to 
receive federal funding.  Under the Perkins Vocational Education 
Act, 20 U.S.C.  2301-2471 (1988) ("Perkins Act"), federal grants 
are issued to the states to "assist the States to expand, 
improve, modernize, and develop quality vocational education 
programs in order to meet the needs of the Nation's existing and 
future work force for marketable skills and to improve 
productivity and promote economic growth."  20 U.S.C.  2301(1).  
The Perkins Act defines vocational education as: 
     organized educational programs which are 
     directly related to the preparation of 
     individuals in paid or unpaid employment in 
     such fields as agriculture, business 
     occupations, home economics, health 
     occupations, marketing and distributive 
     occupations, technical and emerging 
     occupations, modern industrial and 
     agriculture arts, and trades and industrial 
     occupations, or for additional preparation 
     for a career in such fields, and in other 
     occupations, requiring other than a 
     baccalaureate or advanced degree and 
     vocational student organization activities as 
     an integral part of the program; and for 
     purposes of this paragraph, the term 
     "organized education program" means only (A) 
     instruction (including career guidance and 
     counseling) related to the occupation or 
     occupations for which the students are in 
     training or instruction necessary for 
     students to benefit from such training, and 
     (B) the acquisition (including leasing), 
     maintenance, and repair of instructional 
     equipment, supplies, and teaching aids; but 
     the terms do not mean the construction, 
     acquisition, or initial equipment of 
     buildings, or the acquisition or rental of 
     land. 
20 U.S.C.  2471(31) (emphasis added). 
     Funding under the Perkins Act, however, is contingent 
upon the state maintaining or exceeding its own level of 
financial support for these programs.  According to the Act: 
       No payments shall be made under this 
     chapter for any fiscal year to a State unless 
     the Secretary determines that the fiscal 
     effort per student or the aggregate 
     expenditures of such State for vocational 
     education for the fiscal year preceding the 
     fiscal year for which the determination is 
     made, equaled or exceeded such effort or 
     expenditures for vocational education for the 
     second preceding year. 
20 U.S.C.  2463(a).  This requirement is reflected in the Act's 
implementing regulations which provide that:  
     [t]he Secretary may not make a payment under 
     the Act to a State for any fiscal year unless 
     the Secretary determines that the fiscal 
     effort per student, or the aggregate 
     expenditures of that State, from State 
     sources, for vocational education for the 
     fiscal year (or program year) preceding the 
     fiscal year (or program year) for which the 
     determination is made, at least equaled its 
     effort or expenditures for vocational 
     education for the second preceding fiscal 
     year (or program year). 
34 C.F.R.  401.22(a) (1990).  Thus, in order to receive federal 
funding under the Perkins Act, a state must maintain or increase 
its level of financial support for vocational education within 
the state to qualify for funding for the next year.  As the 
federal funding is provided to the states before the Secretary 
determines whether the state qualifies under this section, 
actions brought by the Secretary take the form of actions for 
refunds. 
     The dispute in this case involved whether a particular 
Pennsylvania program, the Customized Job Training Program 
("CJT"), is a vocational education program for the purpose of 
Perkins Act funding.  According to the legislative intent, the 
CJT was created: 
     to meet the training needs of the State's new 
     and expanding business by enhancing the 
     skills of workers of this Commonwealth.  In 
     so doing, funding shall be dedicated towards 
     training projects which result in net new 
     full-time employment opportunities, 
     significant wage improvements, the retention 
     of otherwise lost jobs or other conditions 
     which would offer substantial economic 
     benefit to this Commonwealth.  Recognizing 
     that many regions of the State remain 
     economically distressed, customized job 
     training programs should attempt to meet the 
     special job training needs of these areas. 
App. at 54 (emphasis added).  During the period at issue, the PDE 
had the primary responsibility for approving applications and 
drafting regulations under the CJT.  The program, however, was 
administered by an inter-agency advisory task force comprised of 
representatives from the Pennsylvania Departments of Labor and 
Industry, Commerce, Education, and the Economic Development 
Committee of the Cabinet. 
     The United States Department of Education concluded 
that during fiscal years ("FY") 1989 and 1991, Pennsylvania 
failed to maintain its level of effort on either a per-student or 
aggregate basis.  According to the United States, Pennsylvania's 
aggregate expenditures declined from $67,322,560 in FY 1987 to 
$60,436,193 in FY 1988, and its per-student expenditures declined 
from $283.95 in FY 1987 to $283.04 in FY 1988.  App. at 161, 163, 
165-66.  Pennsylvania's aggregate expenditures also declined from 
$64,026,598 in FY 1989 to $59,917,439 in FY 1990, and its per- 
student expenditures declined from $348.41 in FY 1989 to $332.39 
in FY 1990.  These decreases were discovered during audits 
conducted ending in FY 1989 and FY 1991, and resulted from 
Pennsylvania's decision not to include the CJT program in its 
maintenance of effort after having done so for five years. 
     Pursuant to the Perkins Act, the auditors questioned 
the total amount of federal vocational education funds expended 
during FY 1989 ($41,827,000) and FY 1991 ($39,603,000).  App. at 
154, 159.  After reviewing further information provided by 
Pennsylvania, the Assistant Secretary sustained the finding that 
Pennsylvania failed to maintain its level of fiscal effort in 
FY's 1989 and 1991, but only demanded a refund of the amounts 
Pennsylvania failed to maintain on a per-student basis, totaling 
$3,082,088.95.  Pennsylvania appealed to the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges. 
     Before the ALJ, Pennsylvania presented evidence, 
consisting of nineteen exhibits including affidavits, and legal 
arguments in seeking to establish that it had complied with the 
maintenance of effort requirement for FY's 1989 and 1991.  
Pennsylvania's theory was that the CJT costs should not have been 
included in the calculations as state funds spent on vocational 
education because:  (1) it was within the sole discretion of the 
state to determine whether the CJT program was a vocational 
education program for the purposes of determining its maintenance 
of effort; and (2) the CJT program did not fall under the 
definition of "vocational education" as set forth in the Perkins 
Act. 20 U.S.C.  2471(31). 
     Pennsylvania requested an evidentiary hearing before 
the ALJ, alleging that factual issues remained in dispute.  PDE 
claimed that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in order to 
understand the nature of the CJT program, and with its brief and 
reply brief attached a list of ten witnesses, three affidavits, 
and other documentary evidence to support its claim.  The ALJ 
held a prehearing conference in which he requested stipulations 
to certain proposed evidence.  After the conference, the ALJ 
allowed PDE to submit an amended witness list which included a 
brief statement as to why each proposed witness' testimony was 
important to the determination.  According to PDE, the witnesses' 
testimony would support its claim that the purpose of CJT was to 
provide incentives to businesses and promote economic development 
in Pennsylvania, rather than to provide vocational education to 
adults. 
     The ALJ then issued his initial decision.  He found 
that PDE had failed to maintain its fiscal efforts for the year 
in question and that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.  The 
decision concluded that federal rather than state law controls 
which state activities fall within the federal definition of 
vocational education for calculating maintenance of effort, and 
that the CJT funds fell within the federal definition.  The ALJ 
further found that Pennsylvania's characterization of the CJT 
program as a business incentive program was consistent with 
vocational education under the Perkins Act, and that the funds, 
therefore, had to be included in determining Pennsylvania's 
maintenance of effort.  As to the evidentiary hearing, the ALJ 
concluded, based upon the completeness of the record, the briefs 
and his review of the appropriate submissions,  
     that an evidentiary hearing would serve no 
     useful purpose, and . . . is not needed to 
     resolve any material factual issue in 
     dispute.  In view of the conceded facts, what 
     we have remaining is more in the nature of a 
     dispute as to a matter of law, i.e., the 
     application of specific Federal statutory and 
     regulatory definitions in the face of mainly 
     agreed facts. 
App. at 11 (ALJ's Decision) (emphasis in original).  The 
Secretary certified the ALJ's decision as a final decision of the 
Department, and this appeal followed. 
     On appeal, Pennsylvania "is not requesting that this 
Court reconsider the Department's application of the federal 
definition of vocational education, or that the Court consider 
the questions of fact surrounding the State CJT program.  
Pennsylvania only asks the Court to consider the propriety of the 
issuance of the Department's Decision without an evidentiary 
hearing and without fully considering the evidence in the record 
regarding the State's interpretation of the CJT program."  
Appellant's Br. at 3-4. 
                               II. 
     We have jurisdiction to review the Secretary's decision 
under 20 U.S.C.  1234g.  In general, when reviewing the 
Secretary's decision, we must determine whether the Secretary's 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and 
reflect the application of the proper legal standards.  Bell v. 
New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 792 (1983); Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 
125, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1991).  The Secretary's decision to grant an 
evidentiary hearing is discretionary, however, and will only be 
reversed if it is arbitrary and capricious.  California v. 
Bennett, 843 F.2d 333, 340 (9th Cir. 1988); Bell Telephone Co. of 
Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1267 (3d Cir. 1974). 
                               III. 
                                A. 
     Pennsylvania argues that the ALJ's failure to hold an 
evidentiary hearing denied it the opportunity to present complete 
factual evidence as to the nature of the CJT program.  Whether 
an evidentiary hearing is necessary, however, is left to the 
Secretary's sound discretion.  An administrative agency need not 
provide an evidentiary hearing when there are no disputed 
material issues of fact, Moreau v. F.E.R.C., 982 F.2d 556, 568 
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Altenheim German Home v. Turnock, 902 F.2d 582, 
584 (7th Cir. 1990); California v. Bennett, 843 F.2d at 340; Bell 
Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. FCC, 503 F.2d at 1267-68; or 
when the dispute can be adequately resolved from the paper 
record.  Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. E.P.A., 35 F.3d 
600, 606 (1st Cir. 1994); Louisiana Ass'n of Indep. Producers and 
Royalty Owners v. FERC, 958 F.2d 1101, 1113-15 (D.C. Cir. 1992); 
City of St. Louis v. Department of Transp., 936 F.2d 1528, 1534 
n.1 (8th Cir. 1991).  The Secretary will abuse its discretion 
only when the complaining party demonstrates that the failure to 
provide an evidentiary hearing denied the party "the opportunity 
to speak meaningfully to the issues before the [Secretary]."  
Bell Telephone, 503 F.2d at 1268. 
     The relevant portions of the Department of Education's 
regulations provide that:  
     an ALJ conducts the hearing entirely on the 
     basis of briefs and other written submissions 
     unless -- 
 
         (1)  The ALJ determines, after reviewing 
     all appropriate submissions, that an 
     evidentiary hearing is needed to resolve a 
     material factual issue in dispute. 
34 C.F.R.  81.6(b)(1).  Proceedings before the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges, therefore, are generally conducted on 
the basis of a written record alone.  Evidentiary hearings are 
authorized, but only when the ALJ determines that one is "needed" 
to resolve a material factual issue.  Consequently, the narrow 
predicates for an evidentiary hearing may be summarized simply 
and succinctly as:  (1) a disputed material issue of fact; and 
(2) a need to resolve it. 
     The Secretary's decision that no evidentiary hearing 
was necessary was not arbitrary and capricious. 
     First, there is simply no dispute as to any material 
issues of fact in this case.  Neither the Secretary nor the ALJ 
challenged Pennsylvania's "factual" claim that the CJT is "viewed 
. . . as a labor and economic development program," Appellant's 
Br. at 17.  For example, the ALJ noted that: 
     Certainly, it should not be surprising that a 
     vocational education program would (also) 
     serve "the needs of industry," and notbenefit "only" individuals 
entering fields 
     not requiring baccalaureates or advanced 
     degrees.  This would appear to be true of 
     virtually any vocational education program. 
App. at 9 (ALJ Decision) (emphasis in original).  In fact, the 
Perkins Act, itself, was enacted, inter alia, "to improve 
productivity and promote economic growth."  20 U.S.C.  2301(1).  
Similarly, despite Pennsylvania's remonstrances over the goals 
and objectives of the program, there was no dispute over any of 
the specific job training activities carried out under CJT 
funding, and PDE offered no evidence to demonstrate that the job 
training activities funded by the CJT program did not fit the 
Perkins Act's definition of vocational education.  Accordingly, 
we find that the ALJ was correct in concluding that "[i]n view of 
the conceded facts, what we have remaining is more in the nature 
of a dispute as to a matter of law, i.e., the application of 
specific Federal statutory and regulatory definitions in the face 
of mainly agreed facts."  App. at 11 (ALJ Decision).  
     Second, even if there were disputed material issues of 
fact, the written record was adequate to resolve any remaining 
issues.  Pennsylvania was permitted to submit substantial 
evidence on several occasions to the effect that the CJT was a 
business incentive rather than vocational education program.  
Even assuming that "oral testimony provides a far more complete 
and persuasive analysis of disputed facts than written 
documentation," as PDE contends, there is absolutely nothing 
before us to demonstrate that the written record was inadequate.  
Three of the proposed witnesses filed affidavits, and PDE's 
argument was expounded upon at great length in its submissions.  
Indeed, the testimony of the potential witnesses appears to be 
cumulative at best.  Given the breadth and depth of the written 
record, we cannot say that the ALJ's conclusion that "[t]he 
opinions and credibility of lay witnesses (e.g., Pennsylvania 
state employees) explored on direct or cross-examination as to 
the State's intentions and objectives in administering the CJT 
program would add nothing material to the limited issues involved 
in this proceeding," App. at 11 (ALJ Decision), was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
     But in the end, Pennsylvania's characterization of the 
program as non-vocational is irrelevant in any event.  The 
Perkins Act, not the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, defines what 
constitutes vocational education under the Act.  20 U.S.C. 
 2471(31).  Thus, Pennsylvania's complaint boils down to nothing 
more than a simple dissatisfaction with the conclusion reached by 
the ALJ after applying the uncontested law to undisputed material 
facts.  Surprisingly, however, Pennsylvania does not challenge 
the Secretary's substantive conclusion or its factual 
underpinnings.  Under these circumstances, the opportunities 
provided by the Secretary permitted Pennsylvania to speak 
meaningfully to any factual issues presented in this matter.  As 
such, the Secretary's determination that an evidentiary hearing 
was unnecessary was not arbitrary and capricious. 
                                B. 
     Pennsylvania's final argument is that the Secretary's 
decision impinges upon its right to interpret its own laws.  
According to Department of Education precedent, "it is a 
wellsettled maxim of federalism that Federal tribunals should 
defer to a state's interpretation of its own laws."  In re Oregon 
State System of Higher Education, No. 92-25-SP, Final Decision, 
at 22, 1993 WL 452646, at *11 (Educ. Appeals Bd., Apr. 5, 1993).  
PDE argues that the ALJ's conclusion that the CJT program is a 
vocational education program as provided by the Perkins Act 
conflicts with Pennsylvania's right to characterize the CJT 
program as a business incentive program.  We disagree.  We 
conclude that the ALJ's determination does not in any way 
infringe upon Pennsylvania's sovereign authority. 
     Unlike the cases cited by the PDE in its brief, this 
case does not involve a federal agency telling a state how to 
interpret and implement a state statute as would occur, for 
example, if the state interpreted the word "shall" in a state 
statute to be discretionary, and despite this interpretation, the 
Secretary interpreted it as mandatory.  See In re Gulf Coast 
Trades Center, No. 89-16-S, Decision of the Secretary, at 2-3 
(Oct. 19, 1990) (concluding that the Secretary had to accept the 
state's interpretation of the statute despite the plain reading 
of the text).  PDE quotes Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Federal 
Power Comm'n, 156 F.2d 821, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1946), rev'd 330 U.S. 
802 (1947), for the proposition that: 
     Even if it be said that the [agency] has the 
     right to exercise the judicial function of 
     interpreting its own organic act, it could 
     hardly be added that that agency also 
     possesses the exclusive right to interpret a 
     statute of one of the States of the Union, 
     and to decide the relation between that state 
     legislation and its own Act. 
While this language appears to lend some support for PDE's 
argument, the quote is taken out of context.  The quoted portion 
of the opinion does not stand for the principle that an agency 
must defer to the state when interpreting a state statute in 
conjunction with federal law.  Instead, it stands for the 
proposition that a sovereign state need not "appear before a 
federal administrative body in order to have determined the legal 
effect of one of its statutes considered in connection with a 
related federal statute."  Id.  In other words, administrative 
agencies do not have exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to 
interpreting state law in conjunction with federal law.  But 
neither of these circumstances is presented in this case.  The 
Secretary merely applied the federal definition of vocational 
education for the purposes of the Perkins Act to determine 
whether or not the activities carried out under the CJT program 
fit within that definition.  Pennsylvania can characterize its 
program anyway it pleases.  If, however, the Commonwealth wishes 
to receive federal funding under the Perkins Act, it will be 
subject to the requirements established by federal law. 
     The Perkins Act explicitly defines the activities that 
constitute vocational education under the Act, and vests in the 
Secretary the responsibility for determining whether or not a 
state program funds vocational education for the purposes of 
determining the eligibility to receive federal funding under the 
Act.  20 U.S.C.  2463(a).  In this context, the Secretary's 
application of federal law to the undisputed facts does not 
impinge upon the State's authority to interpret its own laws.  
See In re Webster Career College, Inc., No. 91-39-SP, Decision of 
the Secretary (July 23, 1993) (concluding that the State's 
authority is not being impinged because federal law made the 
Secretary responsible for defining the term "academic year").  
The Secretary, not the state, is responsible for interpreting 
federal law, and in cases which involve an agency's 
interpretation of federal law and its own regulations, we must 
defer to the Secretary.  Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984); Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Comm'n v. Department of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
                               IV. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision 
of the Secretary of the United States Department of Education. 
 
